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PROBLEMS WITH A THEORETICAL ATTITUDE TO THE
INFORMATION CONCEPT
Robert Stephens
University of the West of England
Robert.Stephens@uwe.ac.uk
Abstract
In this paper Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is recruited to argue that information as a conceptual term does
not have its own subject matter, but belongs to peoples’ conceptual grammar. Theoretical accounts of the
nature of information, therefore, are unlikely to clarify the concept, but may unwittingly restrict the range of
application of IS theorising. Instead we should follow Wittgenstein’s recommendation to concentrate on
description of the range and uses to which the term is applied, and practices of the people who use information.

Introduction
In its modern form, information is said to reside in molecules, cells, tissues, genes, minds, libraries, the environment, the economy,
organisations, societies, all sorts of systems, and so on. We can be information rich, poor or saturated, experience information
revolutions and ages, be information analysts, scientists, workers and managers, who have information requirements and needs.
Information itself can be auditory, visual, tactile and electronic, which may be precise, poor, candid, secure, public or private,
dishonest or mischievous.
Among those who work in the information industries it is generally held to be an open scandal that there is no theory, or even
definition, of information, that is both broad and precise enough to accommodate the above uses of the word in a meaningful way.
With respect to technology, many also regret the contribution such a theory could make to the design and construction of
information systems, which, despite a seeming ubiquity, have made a distinctly uneven contribution to either business or society
(e.g., Willcocks and Lester, 1999; Seely Brown, and Duguid, 2000) . A requirement for clarity over information is likely to be
more keenly felt as IS moves its concerns from information structures to information content (Willcocks and Lester, op. cit.),
a trend already apparent with the arrival of ontologies (Guarino, 1995), the semantic web (Berners-Lee, 1999) and supporting
technologies such as XML. Moreover, in an academic context, the theoretical deficit may be inhibiting an understanding of the
role such systems play in a wider context, the development of a core curriculum in education, and a closer collaboration of
researchers and practitioners. Lastly, if information systems as an academic discipline had its own distinct subject matter which
included a robust definition of information, then it would be better equipped to defend itself from cognate, but predatory, emerging
fields such as 'bioinformatics' or 'new media', as well as the more established reference fields of management, computing and
information science.
However, the information concept has been notoriously resistant to analytical resolution: everything can be made to seem obvious,
but very little is. In this paper such a theoretical attitude will be resisted as inappropriate to what is argued to be a conceptual term.
Following from this, it is argued that such a theory would form a barrier rather than a contribution to understanding, and leave
IS as a discipline with a highly stylised, but ultimately idealised, subject matter.
The question being pursued by theoretical accounts is, does information have its own subject matter? What is the commonality
that unites the uses of the term information outlined above? A Wittgensteinian position is adopted here to suggest that even posing
such questions is an invitation to conceptual confusion about the nature of information. 1
Wittgenstein used a simple rule to identify the logical status of categories: if the contrary of a proposition makes sense, then that
proposition can be regarded as an empirical hypothesis, its truth or falsity being dependent on the way things stand in the world.

1

The argument pursued here follows Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) and is particularly informed by McGinn (1997).
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But if the contrary of a proposition does not make sense, then the proposition is not a description of the world but of our
conceptual framework or grammar. Wittgenstein argued at length that this grammar determines sense, not fact or reference. The
rules of this grammar may be articulated in propositional form, but their linguistic appearance as statements of fact typically masks
their actual role as grammatical propositions (Glock, 1996: 131); one is not dealing with a statement of empirical fact about
something in the world, but a statement about the framework with which one then can proceed to make such empirical statements,
it is the saying of something intelligible, something that it makes sense to say (Coulter, 1995).
To follow Wittgenstein’s rule then, in what sense could the statement ‘there is no information’, be correct. The proposition would
not perplex any information worker, for it is obviously sensible that there may be an absence of information, for example, on
benzene emissions, on price elasticity or on mutated haemoglobin. However, where information is taken to have its own
ontological status, the statement ‘there is no information’ immediately yields a contradiction, for the proposition clearly conveys
information of the absence of information.
Though appealing, a meta-linguistic account of information, that is a description of information as an abstract yet worldly
phenomenon, will always be vulnerable to such conundrums because it is unwittingly constructed on the natural reflexivity in
ordinary language that permits conceptual reflection. Information in a proper context, however, is rarely, if ever, likely to be tested
in this way. Indeed, the procedure would appear esoteric and bizarre because the reflexivity is likely to be grounded in a concrete
rather than theoretical situation where the sensibility and intelligibility of information is a genuine working problem (Stephens,
1998).
Wittgenstein's philosophy offers some analytic devices that are appropriate to unravel the conundrum. After characterising the
theoretical attitude, it is argued that portrayal and example are more appropriate for examining the information concept. A leading
Wittgensteinian idea is that the meaning of terms is given by their usage in particular language games that support forms of life,
and a parallel is offered in the conclusion with the analogy that information is best understood as a prosthesis for work. What the
nature of this information is in particular cases therefore can then be left as an open question for investigation.

The Theoretical Attitude
Despite a perceived cognitive deficit in the theoretical understanding of information there is a distinct reluctance to theorize the
topic beyond two conventions: these may be termed ‘preformationist’ and the ‘surrogationalist’. Preformation (Oyama, 1985)
is the common attitude, and rests on the assumption information exists before its utilization or expression. Even when allowing
for the assembly of data from a variety of sources it still implies that it exists in several loci before being collected, thus
perpetuating the attitude while seeming to circumvent it. In addition, information is conceived to be a special kind of cause among
all the factors that may be necessary for a phenomenon, the cause that imparts order and form (or events, actions, etc.) to
everything from organisms to economies.
The preformationist attitude is probably most entrenched in economics and the communication and computer sciences, both of
which have robust though different theoretical frameworks based on the concept, and, more recently in the cognitive sciences and
biology. Here the concept of information is treated syntactically in order to be mathematically tractable or suitable for modelling,
but at the price of excluding the crucial issue of meaning and, integral to meaning, the question of the information’s quality
(Webster, 1995: 27). For people working with information, however, meaningful content is likely to be a definitional criteria.
Information content is theorized by the surrogationalist model, and this is done in terms of representation according to a
Saussurian linguistic model. Information here is a surrogate for events, objects, actions or states that are remote in some sense,
usually time or space, but not always, as in the case of genetic or cognitive information. Some sort of separation of the thing itself
from its representation, however, is crucial as the sign is something standing for something else. The sign is not a static thing, or
even something with physical existence or permanence, but rather a function, a relation between the signified and the signifier,
thus standing for its object in reference to a sort of idea. According to de Saussure, signs acquire meaning not through their
intrinsic value but through their position relative to other signs within a given system. The old axiom, `no computation without
representation' testifies that the concept of representation (information as a surrogate) is still taken to be fundamental and
mandatory to the processing of information. (Cooper, 1992).
Conventionally, using the concept ‘representation’ necessarily constitutes, simultaneously, the concept of a ‘represented object’,
which is (ontologically) by definition something different from its representation. Thus, the act of using the term ‘representation’,
necessarily postulates the existence of an independent ‘pre-represented’ something which will serve as the referent of the
representation, regardless of whether this is of a natural or constructed kind. This concept of representation creates a straight
duality between things and their image, between things and the things which stand for them, which reflects reality like a mirror
1964
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(Ibanez, 1994). The problem can be resolved by stating that all that counts is representations, but this Kantian, idealist and
phenomenological solution then demands that we salvage the referent of the representation. This means that once constituted, the
represented gets reified (usually in a cognitive or linguistic guise) and constrains in a prescriptive way just as a pre-represented
reality itself would. The representational argument, therefore, invariably commits to forms of objectivism or relativism.

Rejection of Theorising
Both preformational and surrogational approaches are usefully and effectively deployed from within their respective disciplinary
frameworks and difficulties with the information concept really only arise when it is treated as just that, as a generic concept with
a singular essence rather than as something specific or relevant to the practice at hand. From a Wittgensteinian perspective what
unites the uses of information allured to above is a ‘family resemblance’ rather than a single essential thread that runs through
all cases. Famously, Wittgenstein used the concept of games to demonstrate the idea of a family resemblance: "Consider for
example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common
to them all? - Don’t say: There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’" - but look and see whether there
is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!" (Wittgenstein, 1953). For the essentialist,
explanations by reference to examples are inadequate and there must be something common to all instances of a concept that
explains why they fall under it, and further, that the only legitimate explanation is an analytic definition which lays down
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application (Glock, 1996: 120).
For Wittgenstein, concepts that share family resemblances on the other hand, are sufficiently and necessarily explained by
characterisation, as they form part of a conceptual grammar, and may therefore be applied correctly or incorrectly according to
appropriate language games, but may not be analytically stipulated a priori. Like similar concepts such as ‘law’, ‘art’, ‘politics’
and ‘science’ definitional versions of ‘information’ may be available and valid from within particular language genres, from
where it is also possible to define what they are not. Where satisfactory definitions are absent, as is ‘notoriously’ the case in, for
example, information systems where circular definitions are common, the question arises of whether this is not due to some
broader conceptual confusion or conflict such as resolving and accommodating competing understandings of information (cf.
Gogeun, 1997).
Attempts to apply otherwise satisfactory definitions beyond their native discourses will always be exposed to such nonsense as,
for example, the information that one has been made redundant as being a ‘reduction in uncertainty’. For Wittgenstein, apparent
grammatical similarities in language can mask profound logical differences such that intelligible statements of certain categories
of things can become nonsense when stated of things that belong to a different category. Hacker (1997) illustrates this by noting
that while the verb ‘to exist’ appears to have precisely the same grammatical form as ‘to eat’ or ‘to drink’, it makes sense to ask
how many people in College don’t eat meat or drink wine, it’s a category error to ask how many people in College don’t exist
(Hacker, 1997: 8). Again, “the rose is red” would be nonsense if it shared the same construction as “2 x 2 is 4”, because grammar
licenses the substitution of ‘=’ for ‘is’ in the latter, but not the former (Glock, 1996: 260).
In the reduction of uncertainty example an electronic signal in a closed, structure-determined environment has no equivalence
in an open social situation where complexity, and therefore uncertainty, maybe increased on receipt of a message. Clearly a
category error has occurred, yet in either case information has an appropriate application in the practice to which the respective
language game is associated. Could an explanation that united the diverse ways of using the term information resolve the issue?
Wittgenstein finds that this way of asking and answering questions, while appropriate for empirical questions, is misleading and
inappropriate when applied to conceptual questions like ‘What is meaning?’, or in this case ‘What is information?’. In the very
act of framing these questions, we are tempted to adopt an attitude towards these phenomena which Wittgenstein believes, makes
us approach them in the wrong way, in a way which assumes that we have to uncover or explain something in the same way one
asks, “What is the specific gravity of gold?’ (McGinn, 1997: 17).
The confusions arising from the theoretical attitude are not mere mistakes, but are misunderstandings which, when we become
reflective about it, language itself has the power to draw us further into (McGinn, 1997: 22). They are therefore deep problems
that arise in situations of reflection or withdrawal from a practical engagement in human affairs. By constructing a theoretical
explanatory account we try to apply to terms such as information a literalness and explanatory force which we never attempt to
give them in ordinary life; we try to transform what is really no more that a way of looking at things into a theoretical account
of the essence of these phenomena. Thus, the things which we are doomed to misunderstand when we take up a theoretical attitude
towards them are just those things ‘that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an
account of [them]’ (Wittgenstein, 1953).
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A Practical Attitude
A leading Wittgensteinian idea is that the meaning of terms such as information is given by their usage in particular language
games that support forms of life. Japan, for example, has a management culture that values human information in much greater
proportion than the US where corporate information systems and the use of structured information is more widespread (Davenport,
1997: 26). Language games are performed both as speech acts and as other activities, as practice with ‘embodied’ meaning within
societal and cultural institutional frameworks. To be able to participate in the practice of a specific language game one has to share
the form of life within which that practice is possible. This includes in particular the institutions and traditions we are born and
encultured into (such as Japanese or American management), and is prior to agreed social conventions and rational reasoning.
Wittgenstein’s language-game concept emphasises the functions that language plays within the active, practical lives of speakers,
that its use is inextricably bound up with the non-linguistic behaviour which constitutes its natural environment (McGinn, 1997:
43), and that language only has meaning in situ, embedded in the lives of those who speak it. While he showed that it is misguided
to insist that representational tokens must refer, he was careful not to conclude, as relativists do, that the particular expressions
at issue did not do so. (His view was that while language games are beyond justification, what is said within them is not).
Whether a verbal or digital communication counts as information, and the former is still the preferred mode for senior
management (Davenport, 1997), can only be assessed according to the time and place of its issue, regardless of whether one is
Japanese or American. A concept (construed as what a word such as ‘information’ actually means) itself cannot be either correct
or incorrect in relation to the world in the same way that an empirical proposition can: it can only be applied correctly or
incorrectly in some given case (Coulter, 1995). (Wittgenstein made the analogy between words and the concepts they express and
‘tools’ or ‘instruments’ to demonstrate this point: just like concepts, a hammer or a screwdriver can be neither correct or incorrect
in itself, but may be used properly or improperly on occasion.)
Language games and forms of life are the context against which information is made meaningful and is given significance (and
if anything, information must be significant); literally, the context in which an event, object or action is made to be information.
But the significance is in the use of information, and not in the fact that an object, event or action with canonical form can be
pointed to. Wittgenstein argues that in real situations, language should be viewed as an instrument or tool for accomplishing
actions, and that the techniques that constitute a language take their point from what lies around them, in the lives of those who
use the language, rather than from an abstract and idealised conception of what representations must consist in. New techniques
arise and others fall away, not in response to any constraint imposed by the essence of language, but in response to the particular
needs and purposes of those who employ them.
The multi-variant uses of the term information outlined at the beginning of this paper may well be assembled from different
language-games (which is why the term disinformation is sometimes legitimate and sometimes an oxymoron according to the
context of its application). By listing some of the situations in which the question of information is raised we have a range of
profoundly different practices or language-games, each on of which invokes a complex cultural setting and semantic genre
(Stephens and Probert, 2000). The distinctiveness of these settings may be concealed by surface similarities surrounding the way
the word information appears, but the fact that each of the language games uses the same particular surface grammatical structure
does nothing to bring these profoundly different practices closer together.
By directing attention towards actual language situations (and away from the abstract world of the theoretician) Wittgenstein the
philosopher, takes seriously his own conception of meaning residing only in specific contexts. By suggesting that the application
of language can be compared to the application of instruments or tools he is directing attention away from a treatment of language
as an abstract system towards seeing what is accomplished in language use. Thus Wittgenstein asserted that language does not
represent, and, although people may use language to represent, this is not simply for observation, but to give shape to, and
coordinate, diverse social action (Shotter, 1993). By giving or lending to already partially specified modes of human relation,
states of affairs or circumstances, a further form or structure which they otherwise would lack, language users may make situations
intelligible, create possibilities for action and so on. Likewise, by defining something as ‘information’, agents or institutions are
actively shaping a context towards the particular activities and ‘forms of life’ where that information is significant and supports
certain actions.

Conclusion
In his later philosophy Wittgenstein argued that we should clarify our thinking by attending to the practical purpose that words
serve. By deliberately avoiding a theoretical stance he hoped to resist ‘the betwitchment of intelligence by means of language’.
1966
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For Wittgenstein the fault is not in making explanations, but in the very idea that conceptual discovery will reveal or clarify
anything. What we really need is to turn our whole enquiry round and concern ourselves, not with the explanation or theory
construction, but with description. Approaching language in abstraction from its use leads to a neglect or misunderstanding of
the rich diversity of language-games that we come to participate when applying words such as information. This diversity is not
something incidental to its essence - the structure and function of language is inextricably linked with the structure and function
of the complex situated activities in which the use of terms such as information is embedded. To reveal the nature of the
phenomenon it is necessary to examine the practices of those who use information.
The problems of sense and reference surrounding conceptual terms such as information are integral to working practice, because,
as Zuboff (1989) and others have argued, digital technology creates a context where work becomes an ensemble of readings,
inferences and interpretations. Conceptual issues are not detachable from empirical ones. They are there whenever a question
arises about what counts as information, about how to interpret information, about what theoretical or practical inferences to draw,
and how to proceed. To delegate responsibility for conceptual issues to a theory of information would be to deny what much
'information work' is really about - the intellectual, social and tactile 'spadework' or 'articulation work' (Suchman, 1996) that
crafts ambiguity and openness into interpretively tractable working situations. For IS professionals, who are ipso facto mandated
to intervene in others' lives, such circumscribed theorising can only be an obstacle to the authentic insights required for ethical
and practical action (Stephens and Probert, 2000).
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